A physical unclonable function (PUF), like a fingerprint, exploits manufacturing randomness to endow each physical item with a unique identifier. One primary PUF application is the secure derivation of volatile cryptographic keys using a fuzzy extractor (FE) comprising: 1) a secure sketch and 2) an entropy extractor. Although the entropy extractor can be lightweight, the overhead of the secure sketch responsible for correcting naturally noisy PUF responses is usually high. We observe that, in general, response unreliability with respect to an enrolled reference measurement increases with increasing differences between the in-the-field PUF operating condition and the operating condition used in evaluating the enrolled reference response. For the first time, we exploit such an inadvertent but important observation. In contrast to the conventional single reference response enrollment, we propose enrolling multiple reference responses (MRRs) subject to the same challenge but under multiple distinct operating conditions. The critical observation here is that one of the reference operating conditions is likely to be closer to the operating condition of the field deployed PUF, thus resulting in minimizing the expected unreliability when compared to the single reference under the nominal condition. As a consequence, MRR greatly reduces the demand for the expected number of erroneous bits requiring correction and, subsequently, achieves a significant reduction in the error correction overhead. The significant implementation efficiency gains from the proposed MRR method are demonstrated from software implementations of FEs on batteryless resource constraint computational radio frequency identification devices, where realistic PUF data are collected from intrinsic static random access memory PUFs.
I. INTRODUCTION
P HYSICAL unclonable functions (PUFs) exploit manufacturing randomness to create inseparable instance-specific secrets, much like a fingerprint of a human being [1] , [2] . A PUF is a promising alternative to low-cost secure key storage. Non-volatile memory (NVM) such as FLASH, predominantly used nowadays for digital key storage in electronic commodities, may require additional masks and process steps for fabrication. In contrast, silicon PUFs are inherently compatible with standard CMOS fabrication processes and reap the benefit of reduced manufacturing costs. In addition, a PUF does not store secrets permanently in a digital manner, instead, it utilizes analog randomness to extract secrets on demand. Therefore, the secret is hidden within the physical structure of integrated circuits (ICs) and cannot easily be measured physically; hence, PUF secrets are much less susceptible to invasive attacks in comparison with NVM stored digital secrets [3] - [5] . This is advantageous when an IC is deployed in a hostile environment where an adversary has physical access to the IC, which is not an unrealistic threat in an Internet of Things (IoT) era. In this era, PUF based security mechanisms, where a PUF can serve as an inseparable root of trust, are attractive for lightweight authentication and key generation applications to secure low-end IoT devices that lack protected key storage mechanisms.
A PUF is characterized by an instance-specific challenge (incoming binary vector) and response (output binary vector) behavior. The same challenge applied to different PUF instances produces significantly different responses. Whenever a challenge is repeatedly queried to the same PUF instance, the response is expected to be constantly reproduced. However, in reality, completely reliable response regeneration is not possible since responses are susceptible to thermal noise and fluctuations in operating voltage and temperature. As a result, noisy responses jeopardize the elementary PUF applications of key generation and authentication. For key generation, the flipped response bits must be reconciled. And for PUF-based authentication, after recent and careful examination of authentication mechanisms by Delvaux [6] , [7] , a fairly conservative approach to craft a secure PUF-based authentication protocol is recognized to convert a noisy response into a stable key and, then follow a keyed 1556-6013 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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algorithm to perform authentication. We can see that secure PUF based authentication methods also require a PUF-based key generator where: i) the response errors are stabilized; and ii) hashed to derive a cryptographic key-together, both procedures are normally termed as fuzzy extractor (cf. Section II-C). Although a PUF key generator and a PUF key generator based authentication mechanism assure a high-level of security, they are challenged by expensive implementation overheads resulting from the error correction process responsible for stabilizing a noisy response. The prohibitive resource demands for error correction poses a major roadblock for adopting PUF key generators on resource constraint embedded computing platforms such as IoT devices with limited computational capability, memory and power. In this paper, we aim to address this problem.
We take an important step to investigate novel methodologies to substantially optimize the overhead of implementing a PUF key generator on, especially, resource limited IoT devices (tokens) such as RFID tags and wireless sensors. Our key observation is that all previous PUF key generators solely enroll a single reference response that is evaluated under the so called nominal operating condition, e.g., room temperature. This is ineffective for reducing the unreliability caused by the fact that the operating condition of a PUF in-the-field can vary greatly from the nominal operating condition used in the enrollment process. 1 In contrast, we propose multiple reference response (MRR) enrollment under discrete operating conditions. The crucial observation is that one of the operating conditions of an enrolled reference response will be closer to the operating condition of the PUF in-the-field. Alternatively, though the reproduced response is fixed and is based on the operating condition of the PUF that is out of the control of the server, the reference response can indeed be flexibly selected by the server. The overall result is a significant reduction in the expected unreliability when compared with the conventional single reference enrollment methodology.
As an immediate application, we combine MRR with a reverse fuzzy extractor (RFE) to realize a MRR based RFE (MR 3 FE) that suits lightweight mutual authentication; attributing to the greatly decreased implementation overhead. To examine the MRR method's generalization, it is adopted to a FE, termed MR 2 FE. Performance efficiency of both MR 3 FE and MR 2 FE are evaluated by software implementations on a computational radio frequency identification (CRFID) device that is batteryless and resource limited. For instance, when a key restoration failure rate of less than 10 −6 is required and pre-selection based MRR enrollment using only three references at {−15 • C, 25 • C, 80 • C} is utilized, MR 3 FE can reduce the clock cycle overhead by 45% in comparison with a conventional RFE, while MR 2 FE can reduce the clock cycle overhead by 42% in comparison with a conventional FE. 1 We recognize that the study in [8] conducted Ring Oscillator frequency measurements under two discrete operating conditions with the objective of maximizing the number of independent response bits enrolled from an ROPUF whilst facilitating the selection of highly reliable bits at a given selection threshold [8] ; however, only the derived single reference is enrolled.
We summarize our main contributions as below: • For the first time, we leverage multiple reference responses (MRR) enrolled under discrete operating conditions for PUF key generation. As an immediate application, a lightweight mutual authentication protocol based on a reverse fuzzy extractor (RFE), dubbed MR 3 FE, is proposed. We also analyze the key failure rate of MR 3 FE. • We demonstrate the significantly reduction of implementation overhead of MR 3 FE through experiments using software implementations targeting a resource constraint IoT token-a batteryless CRFID device-with an embedded SRAM PUF. • To examine the generalization of MRR, we experimentally showcase its applicability to a fuzzy extractor and also validate the substantially reduced implementation overhead. Organization: Section II provides background and related work on FE and RFE, and introduces the conventional RFE-based mutual authentication. Section III describes MRR enabled RFE-based mutual authentication, which is experimentally validated in Section IV. Section V demonstrates the generalization of MRR by adopting it for a FE (MR 2 FE).
In Section VI, we analyze security of MRR when it is exploited for the (R)FE, we also examine limitations of our current investigation and discuss future work. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We begin with a description of the notational format we adopted and give a brief overview of SRAM PUFs. Then we describe related work in the area of fuzzy the extractors (FE) and the reverse fuzzy extractors (RFE), and introduce the conventional RFE-based mutual authentication.
A. Notations
We denote a vector with a bold lowercase character, e.g., response r. We identify an enrolled response from a specific PUF as r, while a reevaluated response from the same PUF is denoted as r . A matrix is denoted with a bold uppercase character, e.g., a parity check matrix H. Functions are printed in sans-serif fonts, e.g., hash function Hash().
B. SRAM PUF
There are various silicon PUF constructions that include: delay-based PUF such as Arbiter PUF (APUF) [9] - [11] and ring oscillator PUF (ROPUF) [1] , [12] - [15] ; mismatch based PUFs such as the static random access memory (SRAM) PUF [16] , [17] , latch PUF [18] , flip-flop PUF [19] , [20] and Buskeeper PUF [21] ; current-based PUF [22] , and nonlinear current mirror based PUF [23] . Readers are referred to [24] and [25] for details of various PUF constructions.
This work chooses SRAM PUFs for experimentally demonstrating the presented MRR methodology. The SRAM memory is pervasively embedded within various electronic commodities. When the SRAM is powered up, each SRAM cell has a favored power-up state. The favored power-up state varies from cell to cell, and chip to chip. Therefore, such power-up patterns of SRAM memory can be treated as a PUF where the address of each cell is a challenge and power-up state the response. The SRAM PUF is one of the most popular silicon PUFs nowadays attributing to the wide scale availability of intrinsic SRAM in embedded computing platforms eliminating the need for hardware modification and extra overhead [26] .
C. (Reverse) Fuzzy Extractor
The reproduction of a given PUF response r is not perfect due to its susceptibility to, for example, thermal noise and varying environmental conditions. Thus, raw responses cannot be directly employed as a cryptographic key. A PUF key generator can turn a response r into a cryptographic key with full bit entropy. Usually, a key generator comprises of: i) a secure sketch; and ii) an entropy extractor. Both together are referred to as a fuzzy extractor (FE) [27] - [29] . The secure sketch computes helper data based on the provisioned response and subsequently utilizes such helper data to correct errors in the regenerated response. There are two prevalent secure sketch schemes to realize a fuzzy extractor: i) code-offset construction; and ii) syndrome construction [28] . We use the syndrome based construction in this paper; we briefly described this construction here.
The secure sketch construction has a pair of functions: Gen() and Rep(). During key enrollment phase, helper data p is computed by using Gen(r), where p = r × H T and H is a parity check matrix of a linear error correction code. The key reconstruction described by Rep(r ,p), where r is the reproduced response that may be slightly different from the enrolled response r, first constructs a syndrome, s = (r × H T ) ⊕ p = e × H T , with e an error vector. Then through an error location algorithm, e is determined. Subsequently, the response r is recovered through r = e ⊕ r . The recovered PUF response r may not be uniformly distributed, therefore, an entropy extraction operation, for example, via a universal hash function, compresses the PUF response into a cryptographic key with full bit entropy.
Normally, in a fuzzy extractor setting, the Gen() function is executed by the server during the provisioning phase to compute helper data. In the field, the Rep() function is implemented on a token. By recognizing that the computational burden of the Rep() function is significantly more than the Gen() function, Van Herrewege et al. [30] place the Gen() on the resource-constraint token while leaving the computationally heavy Gen() function execution to the resource-rich server; this method is termed reverse fuzzy extractor (RFE).
D. RFE-Based Mutual Authentication
A reverse fuzzy extractor is beneficial in reducing the implementation overhead of a PUF key generator on a resource limited token. Mutual authentication built upon a RFE is firstly proposed by Van Herrewege et al. [30] and later improved by Roel [25] . Fig. 1 depicts the RFE-based mutual authentication protocol in [25] . Notably, the gray shaded secure key sk ← Hash(r ) in Fig. 1 is not explicitly utilized in [25] , instead r itself is treated as a shared key between the server and the token. Here, we employ the hash function Hash() to extract the key sk with full bit-entropy rather than using the response r as it may not be uniformly distributed-i.e. not have full bit entropy.
During the one-time enrollment phase, a response r is enrolled by the server and saved in the database (DB). In the authentication phase, the token computes helper data p ← Gen(r ), where r is the reproduced response. The server receives the public helper data p and uses the enrolled response r to restore the r ← Rep(p,r). Only when the distance between r and r is smaller than a threshold d, determined by the designed error correcting capability of the construction, can r = r . Here, only the token and the server share knowledge of the response r . Thus, the secret key sk given by sk ← Hash(r ) is a shared session key. Subsequently, mutual authentication is realized by employing the nonce n t and n s generated by the token's and the server's true random number generators (TRNG), respectively; the usage of a nonce by each party prevents replay attacks.
Notably, The RFE is required to hold two properties: i) correctness; and ii) security.
• Correctness implies that the response r will be successfully recovered based on the enrolled response r and helper data p through r ← Rep(r,p) on the condition that FHD(r,r )≤ d |r| , where FHD() evaluates fractional Hamming distance (FHD) between two binary vectors. • Security implies that given the exposed helper data p, there is adequate residual entropy in the generated response r . Our focus is on the correctness requirement as we are aiming to significantly reduce the Gen() implementation overhead on a token based on the MRR method. We are not intending to invent a methodology to enhance the security of RFEs or the RFE-based mutual authentication mechanism, we retain their security properties [31] - [33] . Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, we discuss the security of (reverse) fuzzy extractors in Section VI.
III. MULTIPLE REFERENCE RESPONSE BASED REVERSE FUZZY EXTRACTOR (MR 3 FE)
In this section we explain our intuition for developing the multiple reference response (MRR) approach, and then focus on the application of the approach in its most interesting context, the reverse fuzzy extractor (RFE). We explain our rationale by developing an understanding of response unreliability.
The commonly used PUF reliability model, e.g., [27] , [34] , assumes a fixed error rate, specifically, each response reevaluation is assigned the same error rate. This is also referred to as the homogeneous response error rate. In practice, PUF responses are experimentally demonstrated to exhibit a bitspecific reliability-heterogeneous error rate [35] , [36] . In this study, we consider the expected value of BER as in [34] since this provides not only a convenient but also a valid method to analyze the key failure rate in relation to a (reverse) fuzzy extractor. Now, we can express BER as:
where r and r are two distinct and random response evaluations subject to the same challenge applied to the same PUF.
Here E() is an expectation operator. Commonly, r is a reference response evaluated under a given operating condition and r is the reproduced response evaluated, most likely, under a differing operating condition. BER is influenced by factors such as thermal noise as well as environmental parameters such as supply voltage and temperature. We use an example to explain our observations and rationale. Fig. 2 (a) 2 illustrates a single reference response enrolled under 25 • C 3 ; the nominal reference operating condition. We can see that the BER increases when the operating temperature deviates away from the reference operating condition of 25 • C. The maximum BER is around 10%, which occurs at −25 • C. The minimum BER is under the reference temperature of 25 • C. Here, we reason the minimum BER to be solely caused by thermal noise. In Fig. 2(b) , the reference response is enrolled under 50 • C. We can see that the minimum BER appears at 50 • C; the nominal reference operating condition in this case. The maximum BER is approximately 12% when the regenerated response is evaluated under −25 • C, that is 75 • C lower the reference operating condition. Similarly, in Fig. 2(c) , when the reference response is enrolled under 0 • C, the minimum BER occurs at 0 • C and the maximum BER around 12% occurs when the operating condition increases by 75 • C.
In summary, no matter which specific nominal reference operating condition is selected, for example, −25 • C, 25 • C or 50 • C, the minimum BER is always at the reference operating condition. BER increases as the difference between the reference operating condition and the operating condition under which response r is reproduced increases. A deviation of the operating conditions of the PUF in the field from that under which a response is enrolled will always lead to a deterioration in the expected BER. Although we cannot change the operating condition under which the PUF operates in the field, we recognize that we can choose a suitable reference operating condition during response reconciliation to reduce the maximum number of erroneousness bits we expect in a regenerated response. Next, we utilize this important observation to reason about the multiple reference response based RFE mutual authentication (MR 3 FE) mechanism. Fig. 3 depicts the proposed MR 3 FE mutual authentication protocol. In comparison with conventional RFE based mutual authentication (cf. Fig 1) , there are two distinct differences:
A. RFE Based Mutual Authentication With MRR
• In the enrollment phase, instead of enrolling a single reference response, the server enrolls multiple reference responses; each reference response is evaluated at a different operating condition. This is highlighted in ①.
• In the authentication phase, the server recovers the regenerated response r of the token based on the enrolled multiple reference responses. This is highlighted in ②. Next we elaborate on the MR 3 FE mutual authentication by taking two reference responses as an example.
An Example with Two Reference Responses: In Fig. 2 , during the enrollment phase, we assume that the server enrolls two reference responses, r 1 and r 2 , evaluated under 50 • C and 0 • C, respectively. It is worth reminding that r 1 and r 2 are subject to the same challenge applied to the same PUF.
In the authentication phase, the token measures the response r and then computes helper data p ← Gen(r ). In addition, verification data u 1 ← Hash(ID i , n t , sk, p) is computed, where u 1 is a keyed hash value with sk as the key. The ID i is the ID of current token, n t is a nonce generated by the token. ID i , n t , p along with u 1 are publicly sent to the server.
The server now attempts to reconstruct the response r based on its enrolled responses: r 1 and r 2 . This can be handled in an iterative way. The server first uses r 1 to generate r ← Rep(r 1 , p). Once response r is obtained, the server verifies whether Hash(ID i , n t , sk , p) equals the verification value u 1 sent by the token using the recovered secret key sk ← Hash(r ). If the verification is successful, then sk = sk , for this reason, response r is deemed to be successfully restored. Mutual authentication can now proceed based on the shared secret session key sk. If Hash(ID i , n t , sk , p) is not equal to u 1 and the verification fails, the server continues to use r 2 for reconstructing r to determine whether r can be successfully recovered.
Notably, it is only after both r 1 and r 2 are exhausted in the recovery of the response r that MR 3 FE based mutual authentication fails. This occurs on the condition that the verification of u 1 has failed and implies that the recovery of r has failed.
Advantages: We can illustrate the advantages of a MR 3 FE using the example above. Let us first assume that the computed helper data p by the token is only supposed to guarantee a successful secret key sk reconstruction by the server with sk ←Hash(r ) when the BER is no more than 5%-in other words, less than 5% of response bits being erroneous under a reevaluation. Assume a single reference response r under 25 • C is utilized for key reconstruction by the server, as in the conventional RFE case, and the response r is reproduced under an operating condition of −25 • C. We can observe from Fig. 2 (a) that the r is highly unlikely to be correctly recovered by the server because the BER based on the reference response r evaluated under 25 • C is much higher than 5% at −25 • C.
Let's now assume employing two reference responses, r 1 and r 2 , as in the MR 3 FE setting, and still assume that r is from the PUF operating under −25 • C. We can see that reference response r 2 has a high chance to successfully recover response r relying on the fact that the BER based on r 2 evaluated under 0 • C as a reference response is now less than 5%-see Fig. 2(c) . Similarly, if r is measured from a PUF operating under 75 • C, then using r 1 evaluated under 50 • C as a reference response will lead to a BER of less than 5%, see Fig. 2 (c), and consequently, a successful response recovery.
Overall, we can see that in practice, the server is unable to change the operating condition under which the regenerated response r is evaluated. Consequently, an approach using a single reference response is forced to account for a significantly higher BER than at the nominal operating condition. In contrast, we can observe that the proposed MRR approach facilitates the server to employ an appropriate reference response to minimize the expected difference between a reference response r and the regenerated response r to meet a given error correcting capability threshold d.
Next, we analyze the key reconstruction failure rate of MR 3 FE mutual authentication; this is also the false rejection rate of the authentication mechanism.
B. Key Failure Rate
To validate the efficiency of the proposed MR 2 FE and MR 3 FE, we focus on the average failure rate of the PUF key generator. In [35] , it is demonstrated that the expected value of key failure rate based on a bit-specific reliability model is equivalent to the key failure rate predicted under the commonly used reliability model with a fixed response error rate-as in Eq. 1. In other words, the homogeneous reliability model correctly captures the average key failure rate of a PUF key generator [28] , [35] . Therefore we will use BER defined in (1) to derive key failure rate.
Our study uses the family of BCH(n, k, t) linear codes with a syndrome based decoding strategy to realize a reverse fuzzy extractor considering its popularity [27] , [28] and its security property [28] , [37] -we discuss security of (reverse) fuzzy extractors in Section VI. Here, n is the codeword length, k is the code size, t is the number of errors that can be corrected within this n-bit block. Assuming response bit are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we can express the average key failure rate of recovering an n-bit response r based on a selected reference response r j , termed as P 1 j , where the j ∈ {1, .., J } with J as the number of multiple references employed by the server, as:
where BER j is the BER using r j as the reference response.
Here, F B () is a cumulative density function of a binomial distribution with t successes in n Bernoulli trials, with each trial having success probability of p, expressed as:
A BCH(n, k, t) encoding produces (n − k)-bit helper data assumed to be publicly known while k bits form the secret key material. For a single BCH(n, k, t) block, the complexity of finding the k-bit response from r is 2 k . It is not common to use a single large BCH(n, k, t) block; typically a large block is split into small processing blocks to reduce implementation complexity (overhead) [38] . For k bits of key material, response r can be divided into multiple nonoverlapping blocks of a BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) code where n 1 < n and k 1 < k for a parallel implementation. Now the complexity of finding the k bit secret is 2 k 1 ·L where L is the number of parallel BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) code blocks used to realize k bits of secret key material. Given a BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) code employed to gain a security level of k bits with L = * k/k 1 blocks, the key recovery failure rate under the assumption of i.i.d code blocks is:
When all J reference responses {r 1 , ..., r j , ..., r J } are employed, r reconstruction fails only when all reference responses cannot restore the response r . Therefore, the key failure rate P fail for J reference responses can be expressed as a joint probability distribution:
However, due to the complexity of PUF response properties, e.g., correlations, formally deriving a joint distribution without assuming that {r 1 , ..., r j , ..., r J } are independently drawn under distinct operating conditions is a non-trivial task. 4 Here, we take a very conservative evaluation of the key failure rate P fail without a prior notion of independence implied on the reference responses {r 1 , ..., r j , ..., r J }. 5 We recognize that we can express an upper bound for the key failure rate P fail as:
Now we adopt the very conservative estimate:
in our analysis.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATIONS
We employ the ultra low power microcontrollers used in CRFID transponders (WISP5.1LGR) to evaluate the overhead of the proposed MR 3 FE mutual authentication mechanism as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The battery-less CRFID transponder is a highly resource constrained device that operates on harvested power from radio frequency energy. A CRFID device is representative of a low-end resource limited IoT device. Since a CRFID device has SRAM memory, it has the potential to use an intrinsic SRAM PUF as a trust anchor without requiring additional hardware [39] .
A. SRAM PUF Dataset
The SRAM PUF dataset used is from 23 MSP430FR5969 microcontrollers (MCUs) used in CRFID transponders (cf. Fig. 4 ) and included data from 20 MCUs obtained from the publicly available dataset in the study by Su et al. [39] . From each MCU, the power-up states of 16,384 (2KB) SRAM cells are read as SRAM PUF responses. The dataset consists 4 Under an assumption of independence, the key failure rate P fail = J j =1 P 2 j . 5 Our conservative evaluation of the key failure rate P fail implies that the overhead reduction benefits reported by our MRR approach is also conservatively assessed. of 100 repeated response measurements under the temperature conditions: −15 • C, 0 • C, 25 • C, 40 • C and 80 • C. It has been experimentally shown that the SRAM PUF reliability is much less sensitive to voltage variations compared with temperature fluctuations attributing to a SRAM cell's symmetric structure [25] , [40] , [41] . Hence, we focus on reliability under varying temperature conditions in our study.
B. Overhead Evaluations 1) Test Setup:
The test environment used is Texas Instruments' (TI) Code Composer Studio (CCS) 7.2.0, the C code used is downloaded to a MSP430FR5969 LaunchPad Evaluation Kit via USB. TI CCS has a built-in GCC toolchain for our hardware kit. This includes the msp430-gcc-6.4.0.32 win32 compiler. Considering that our main goal is to demonstrate the enhanced efficacy of MR 3 FE compared to the conventional RFE in a relative manner, dedicated optimization of the C code was deemed out of scope. Optimization [42] of the fuzzy extractor software implementation can be carried out in the future to further minimize the absolute implementation overhead of the MR 3 FE.
The software instructions are executed sequentially as advanced out-of-order execution is unavailable for typical resource constraint MCUs. The overhead measured in terms of clock cycles to complete the algorithm is our primary concern. We measured clock cycles using the Profile Clock tool supported in the CCS environment. In addition, we also measured memory usage. Besides the 2 KB SRAM memory embedded in the MSP430FR5969 microcontroller, it is configured with a 63 KB Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM). Here FRAM usage (overhead) is reflective of code size, while the SRAM usage represents size of the internal state used by the algorithm. The code size is assessed by the .text block in FRAM using the Memory Allocation tool in CCS where the internal state is manually counted for any local variables declared inside the algorithm routine.
Hash function and BCH code encoding are two pivotal components for realizing the MR 3 FE and dominates the overhead of the MR 3 FE implementation. We comprehensively evaluate these building blocks by testing the following.
• Hash Functions: Six different hash functions are tested.
The results are listed in Table IV in the Appendix. We evaluate clock cycles and memory overhead. The input message size we selected is 240 bytes for these tests. Among all six software based hash implementations, the BLAKE2s-128 with a 128-bit hash presents the best performance. Therefore BLAKE2s-128 is selected for our evaluations. • BCH Code Encoding: BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) code encoding overhead under different n 1 , k 1 , t 1 settings are tested. Results are detailed in Table. V in the Appendix.
C. Comparisons

1) BER:
We first evaluate BER under three different response enrollment strategies: i) single readout; ii) majority voting; and iii) pre-selection.
• In the single readout response enrollment, all the enrolled responses under a distinct temperature is evaluated only once. • In the majority voting response enrollment, all the responses under a distinct temperature are evaluated 9 times and then the majority vote is applied for enrollment. • In the pre-selection response enrollment, first, each response under 25 • C is repeatedly measured 10 times, only the response bits exhibiting 100% reliable regenerations (all '1's/'0's) are selected-12% of bits are discarded during this process. Then the reference responses under other temperatures, −15 • C, 0 • C, 40 • C, 80 • C are obtained by applying majority voting to the preselected responses under 25 • C using 9 repeated measurements. BER evaluations based on the three different response enrollment approaches-single readout, majority voting and pre-selection-are illustrated in Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , respectively.
We observe the following: • Regardless of response enrollment strategy, it is empirically verified that the BER increases as a function of the temperature difference between the response regeneration temperature and the reference temperature. • As expected, both majority voting and pre-selection approaches reduce BER; the pre-selection strategy is more efficient. 2) Key Failure Rate: Based on BER values obtained from the three different response enrollment strategies, we are able to evaluate the key failure rate. We use parallel BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) blocks as discussed in Section III-B. We consider an evaluation under the preference of deriving a 128-bit secret. Therefore, we determine the number of BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) blocks required by using 128 k 1 . The key failure rates we have determined is detailed in Table. II. We observe the following:
• Before applying MRR, majority voting and pre-selection reduces the BER and thus decreases the key failure rate. • Regardless of response enrollment approaches, our MRR approach further suppresses the key failure rate. In other words, the MRR approach complements response reliability enhancement approaches such as majority voting and pre-selection performed in the enrollment phase. 3) Overhead: We are now able to compare the overhead of the MR 3 FE (RFE with MRR) with the conventional RFE (only using a single reference response) when they are implemented on a CRFID token. Considering performance advantages, BLAKE2s-128 is chosen for the hash function (cf . Table. IV in the Appendix). It is worth reminding here that RFE based mutual authentication requires a hash operation for three times as highlighted in ③, ④ and ⑤ (cf. Fig. 3 ). In Table. II, the overhead of RFE based mutual authentication is detailed when SRR, 2MRR, 3MRR are deployed. We observe the following from our experiments:
• Single Readout Response (SRR) Enrollment: To achieve P fail < 10 −6 , ten BCH(255,13,59) blocks Although memory usage reduction is not significant, our MRR approach leads to usage of a smaller BCH code size (less FRAM usage) and less internal state (less SRAM usage) at run time. In terms of the most concerned performance measure-MCU clock cycles-we can observe that MRR always greatly outperforms SRR. The MRR approach significantly reduces the clock cycle overhead (nearly over 43% reduction) to achieve the same key failure rate as the conventional SRR method. Alternatively, given the same overhead, the key failure rate is reduced by several orders of magnitude by employing our MRR method.
V. MULTIPLE REFERENCE RESPONSE BASED FUZZY EXTRACTOR (MR 2 FE)
This section examines the generalization of the developed MRR methodology. We investigate the practicality of MRR when it is adopted into a FE scenario. In this context, the target device for implementation is not necessarily a highly resource constraint IoT device like the CRFID transponder. We assume that the employment of a FE is mainly to derive a secure cryptographic key, while minimizing the FE implementation overhead is always a desirable goal. In the case of MRR enabled FE-termed MR 2 FE, recall that it is the PUF device that iteratively carries out decoding and checking to identify whether the key is correctly recovered.
A. MR 2 FE
The MR 2 FE key generator operates as follows: 1) During the key enrollment phase, the server registers {r 1 ,...,r j ,..., r J }, which are responses subject to the same challenge but generated under differing operating conditions: {OC 1 ,...,OC j ,...,OC J }. Response r j is hashed to gain a cryptographic key sk j ← Hash(r j ). The server computes helper data p j ← Gen(r j ), where j ∈ {1, ..., J }. 2) During the key reconstruction phase, the PUF device regenerates response r . Then the PUF device loads helper data p j , assumed to be public information and sent from the server at run time or loaded from an insecure off-chip/on-chip NVM. Simultaneously, the server sends a verification value u j ← Hash(ID,n s ,sk j ,p j ) along with ID and n s -the nonce generated by the TRNG on the server--to the PUF device.
3) The PUF device performs r j ← Rep(p j ,r ), where r j =r j only on the condition that u j = u j ← Hash(ID,n s ,sk j ,p j ), with sk j = Hash(r j ). Once this occurs, the PUF device is deemed to have successfully restored the response r j . Thus the secret key sk j is recovered and the following steps are skipped. 4) Otherwise, if u j = u j , then the secret key sk j reconstruction fails.
Step 2 and 3 must be repeated for reconstructing another key sk i using helper data p i , where i = j . 5) If none of the sk j , j ∀{1, ..., J }, reconstructions are successful, the key reconstruction fails. As we can observe here that the server actually enrolls J helper data; each corresponding to one reference response generated under a varying operating condition. The PUF device iteratively conducts key reconstruction attempts to recover one enrolled cryptographic key, sk j . If one of them is successfully reconstructed, the key recovery succeeds. Otherwise, if none of them succeeds, key reconstruction failure occurs.
To study the overhead of the MR 2 FE key generator, we comprehensively evaluate the BCH code decoding overhead-this corresponds to the Rep() implementation overhead.
B. BCH Code Decoding
BCH(n 1 , k 1 , t 1 ) code is chosen again for consistency, its decoding overhead under different n 1 , k 1 , t 1 settings are tested, results are detailed in Table. V in the Appendix. The experimental setup is same as that described in Section IV-B.1.
C. Comparison
Following the operational steps of the MR 2 FE key generator (cf. Section V-A), we are able to quantitatively compare the MR 2 FE implementation overhead imposed on the token given SRR, 2MRR and 3MRR. Similar to Section IV-C, we still select BLAKE2s-128 hash function. MR 2 FE needs to execute the Rep() function at most J times and the Hash() function 2 × J times. This is significantly different from the MR 3 FE where increasing J , the number of reference responses, brings no extra computational overhead to the token.
In practice, the recovery of secret key sk j that is from a nominal operating condition, e.g., room temperature, is recommended to be tried first. Because, the response r will be more likely reproduced under an operating condition that is close to the nominal operating condition. On the condition that such a trial succeeds, the remaining trials are no long needed-step 4) and 5) are skipped-and the imposed overhead is further reduced. Nevertheless, we analyze the worst-case scenario, that is assuming that all J trials have to be performed by the PUF device before a successful key recovery. Overhead comparisons for a FE with SRR, 2MRR, 3MRR are detailed in Table II . We can make the following observations. 1) Single Readout Response Enrollment: To achieve a P fail < 10 −6 , ten BCH(255, 13, 59) MR 2 FE still greatly outperforms the conventional FE with SRR. The reason lies on the fact that MR 2 FE alleviates the demanding for a large BCH code block for decoding (BCH decoder complexity grows approximately with the square of the block size [43] ). Therefore, given same key failure rate and a moderate number J of enrolled models, for example J = 3, MR 2 FE still consumes significantly less overhead even when it is the PUF device that performs J recovery attempts. Overall, the overhead experimental results in Table II demonstrates that the efficiency gains from the MRR methodology also applies to a fuzzy extractor setting.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, first, we analyze security, including helper data manipulation attacks, brute-force attacks and entropy leakage of (reverse) fuzzy extractors with MRR. Second, we show that MRR is not specific to SRAM PUFs, but appears to be generic to other silicon PUF types as well. Third, through hash and secure sketch overhead comparisons, we highlight the significance of reducing the overhead of a secure sketch implementation for constructing a lightweight (reverse) fuzzy extractor. Then, we discuss limitations of our investigation and provide directions for future work.
A. Helper Data Manipulation Attack
Delvaux and Verbauwhede [44] , [45] first introduced helper data manipulation (HDM) attacks, although not on helper data generated from fuzzy extractors. In [28] , HDM attacks are applied on a soft-decision error correction decoding. Here, the attacker sends manipulated helper data to the PUF key generator and observes key recovery failures. Over multiple queries, the attacker learns information about the PUF response, which eventually allows the attacker to recover the response. To prevent such an attack, one potential countermeasure is to check the integrity of helper data [28] . During the key enrollment phase, the helper data p and the enrolled response r are hashed together to produce the hash value u. The hash value u is validated during the key recovery phase. Consequently, a helper data manipulation attack will always fail because the attacker is unable to provide a valid hash u since the attacker has no knowledge of the response r.
Becker [37] recently revealed a new HDM attack strategy against robust fuzzy extractors. In general, instead of attempting to recover the secret PUF response, the HDM attack attempts to set the PUF response corrected by the key generator to a response r a predetermined by an attacker. Consequently, the attacker attempts to defeat the helper data integrity checks by crafting a hash value u a and helper data p a in an attempt to manipulate the PUF key generator with a high probability of producing the response r a crafted by the attacker during the response error correction process. Such an HDM attack now allows an attacker to impersonate the PUF integrated device. Further, Becker's extended HDM attack allows the adversary to recover the original response r, and the secret key. Various error correction codes including Reed-Muller codes [46] , [47] based on different decoding strategies, soft-decision codes [36] , [47] and even-numbered repetition decodes [47] are examined and shown to be vulnerable [37] .
A generic countermeasure against Becker's HDM attacks does not yet exist and remains an open challenge [37] . However, the ability to mount the attacks depends on: i) the error correction code employed; and ii) the method used for error correction. Becker [37] shows linear BCH code based syndrome decoding is immune to HDM attacks; an attacker is unable to set a specific response, although helper data may be manipulated to cause the corrected response bits to flip. 6 Our evaluations on MR 2 FE and MR 3 FE is built upon BCH codes and employ syndrome decoding secure under HDM attacks. Nevertheless, the method we propose is agnostic to the fuzzy extractor employed, because we do not rely on any specific code or decoding strategy.
Further, recall that helper data is manipulated and sent to the PUF device, while the attacker tests the key failure to determine their success. This implies that the attacker is able to conduct an arbitrary number of queries albeit less than the complexity of a brute force attack or random guessing. In a reverse fuzzy extractor setting, it is the PUF device or token performing the Gen() operation to generate helper data. Thus, whenever a HDM attack is orchestrated by an attacker, the manipulated helper data is sent to the server. Consequently, HDM attacks target the server in the context of a reverse fuzzy extractor. In this setting, the HDM attack is very likely to be detected by the resourceful server because of the abnormal key reconstruction failure rates resulting from the tampered helper data. It is not unreasonable to conjecture that in a reverse fuzzy extractor setting, and when faced with a more intelligent server, an attacker will lose the assumed ability to apply an arbitrary number of queries.
B. Entropy Leakage
Given a secure sketch with BCH(n,k,t) code, entropy leakage is caused mainly from the public helper data. The wellknown min-entropy loss is the n − k bound given the exposure of helper data. This n − k bound is conservative. Research studies have explored the derivation of a tight bound for minentropy loss [28] , [31] , [48] . However, calculation of minentropy loss using the tight bound in [48] requires undertaking exhaustive simulations as a straightforward analytical method is not available. The purpose of our work is to demonstrate that the MRR method significantly reduces a token's (reverse) fuzzy extractor implementation overhead. Therefore, we consider the conservative (n − k) min-entropy loss bound where the public helper data generated by the BCH(n,k,t) code leaks (n −k)-bit entropy [31] , [48] . Then, taking response bias b into account, the residual min entropy H ∞ of the n-bit response r conditioned on the public helper data p can be expressed as:
The reverse fuzzy extractor and a conventional fuzzy extractor might not provide identical security guarantees expressed by Eq 8. This is because a reverse fuzzy extractor can result in unanticipated entropy loss under repeated helper data exposure associated with a given PUF response r ; unless, PUF responses demonstrate a symmetry property. In other words, the one-probability, the probability of a given bit attaining a binary one value, of PUF responses is a symmetric distribution [32] ; alternatively, are unbiased. Generally, the extra entropy loss is a result of the leakage of bit-specific reliability information [48] .
The extra entropy loss is important only when PUF response bias is considerably different from the ideal value of 50% as shown by the analysis in [6] and [48] . We can see that for the SRAM PUFs tested in our work, the extra entropy loss is very small. For instance, at 25 • C the evaluated mean bias of SRAM PUFs we tested is 49.87%. Such a small bias aligns with expectations from modern silicon PUFs according to other studies [25] . In this context, employing a few more response bits in the reverse fuzzy extractor can compensate for the small extra loss in entropy. As observed by Delvaux [6] , for a PUF with low bias within [0.42, 0.58], increasing the length of raw responses alone is an effective measure. If the bias is severe, entropy compensation by solely increasing the length of raw responses becomes ineffective. As a result, debiasing the biased raw responses [31] must be undertaken first, e.g., via classic von Neumann (CVN) debiasing, pair-output von Neumann debiasing with erasures ( -2O-VN). Notably, not all debiasing schemes offer reusability-multiple use of the same PUF response-for a reverse fuzzy extractor [48] . Nevertheless, a reverse fuzzy extractor with MRR is naturally compatible with debiasing schemes that offer reusability.
We also tested the SRAM PUF bias in our dataset under the five different operating temperatures. We want to examine if there is a relationship between the bias-fraction of '1's-and the temperature. If there are more '1'/'0' responses, indicative of severe bias, when the temperature is higher or lower, then the temperature might cause an unanticipated entropy loss. The bias of 23 SRAM PUFs under varying temperature is detailed in Fig. 8 . We can observe that the mean bias is almost invariant to temperature. Therefore, we can expect that a change in the operating temperature to not lead to additional entropy loss.
C. Brute Force Attack Complexity Under MRR
We recognize that under a MRR model, whilst retaining the security properties of a given secure sketch, brute force attack complexity will reduce. Consider, using six parallel BCH(127,22,23) codes as outlined in Table. I and Table. II. According to Eq. 8, we can obtain a key sk having a 129-bit entropy given a bias of 0.4987 obtained from SRAM PUF test data. Therefore, without knowledge of sk, the probability of an adversary succeeding in a brute-force attack to determine sk is 1 2 129 when a conventional single reference response is employed in the reconstruction. When J multiple response references are employed, the server or token can attempt to reconstruct the response, effectively, J times to obtain the key sk. Correspondingly, the brute-force attack complexity decreases linearly as a function of the number of multiple reference response models J ; in our example, the probability of a brute force attack succeeding is J 2 129 . In general, for J multiple reference responses and min-entropy bound as expressed in Eq. 8, we can express the probability P brute of a successful brute force attack as Now, given J MRR models, brute-force attack complexity reduces only slightly while significantly alleviating failure probability P fail and the token's Gen() or Rep() implementation overhead as shown in Table. I and Table. II, respectively. For example, consider the probability of key failure P fail = 2.08×10 −5 for SRR and 5.47×10 −13 for 3MRR for the BCH (127,22,23) code in our example given in Table. I, when preselected response enrollment approached is utilized. Compared to the 3 fold increase in the success of a brute force attack, still extremely low, 3MRR has resulted in more than 10 7 fold decrease in the key failure rate. Further, consider achieving a key failure rate of less than 10 −6 using SRR. We can see from Table. I that 10 parallel blocks of BCH(255,13,59) have to be used when a single readout response enrollment is adopted. Considering the implementation overhead of a reverse fuzzy extractor on a token to also achieve key failure rate less than 10 −6 employing MRR, nine smaller BCH(127, 15, 27) are adequate. In this context, the overhead in terms of CPU clock cycles is reduced by 43% with 3MRR-2,329,519 vs 1,316,184 clock cycles. We can see that the gains in failure rate and implementation overhead more than compensate for the very small reduction in brute force attack complexity.
D. Generalizabilty of MRR
We have validated the MRR method with SRAM PUFs where operating conditions that deviate from the reference condition results in responses that exhibit a higher BER than that responses generated at the enrolled reference condition. We can observe that this behavior agree with other experimentally validated silicon PUFs such as ROPUFs [49] , Latch PUFs, D flip-flop PUFs, Buskeeper PUF and Arbiter PUFs [25] summarized in Table III and obtained from published literature. We can see that, in general, the BER increases when the difference between the reference operating condition and the condition under which the response is regenerated increases. We have shown in our study that in this context, our MRR approach provides the capability to select a reference operating condition that is potentially closer to the specific operating condition of the in-the-field PUF. Therefore, in general, we can expect the MRR approach to provide an implementation efficiency for silicon PUFs.
E. MRR Enrollment
We observe that an improvement in the error correction efficiency is always achieved with trade-offs; for instance, increasing the enrollment overhead while reducing the key failure rate. We can see in a soft-decision decoding approach as in [50] , the PUF-key generator efficiency is enhanced but requires repeated response measurements, in the order of 10 to 100, to collect individual bit's reliability information as additional helper data [50] . A preprocessing method such as majority voting that can be used with hard decision decoding to reduce key failure rates also requires repeated measurements during the response bit enrollment phase [51] .
In our MRR approach, we trade-off the overhead of enrolling multiple reference responses during enrollment with a significantly reduced implementation efficiency on a token. More specifically, we can see that our MRR approach requires a moderate increase in enrollment overhead-enrolling J reference responses given J operating conditions 7 while it significantly reduces the encoding/decoding implementation overhead on a PUF token.
We can see that MRR facilitates minimizing the token overhead. We can also see that the corresponding implementation efficiency on a token increase the computation burden on a server because multiple reference responses now need to be evaluated in parallel. Our results demonstrate a small number of reference models, for example J = 3 in our evaluation, already greatly improves (reverse) fuzzy extractor implementation efficiency on a token. For instance, in the reverse fuzzy extractor case, compared to a single readout response enrollment strategy used to achieve a key failure rate of P fail < 10 −6 , the reverse fuzzy extractor with 3MRR reduces the clock cycle overhead by 43%. In addition, the MRR enrollment overhead is only incurred once during the enrollment phase but the benefits from the MRR approach extends to the life of the token. In the context of resource limited devices such IoT devices, or the CRFID token we have employed in our evaluations, minimizing implementation overhead is highly desirable in practice. We can expect a resourceful server in such a context to easily manage the increase in computation overhead.
F. Hash and Encoding/Decoding Overhead
Based on Table IV, Table V and Table VI , we can see that it is paramount to minimize the absolute error correction overhead for not only the Gen() but also Rep() function because the overhead of a hash function is always much less than that of secure sketch. In other words, regardless of whether a RFE or a FE is employed, the Gen() and Rec() implementation overhead is always dominant.
According to the fully implemented PUF-based key generator on an FPGA platform by Maes et al. [27] , where concatenated (7, 1, 3) repetition code and a BCH(318, 174, 17) code was used, the BCH(318, 174, 17) and (7, 1, 3) repetition code decoder costs were 112 and 37 FPGA slices respectively, while the hash implementation of SPONGENT-128 only occupied up 22 slices. The hash function logic overhead was only 15% of the error correction logic. Our code encoding/decoding overhead evaluation agrees with this observation but from a different implementation. In particular, our results are from implementations in software rather than hardware, as in [27] . In fact, in the software implementation of the hash and BCH decoder, in comparison to the hardware implementation, the relative hash overhead is much less than the BCH decoder. We can conclude, based on our results, that a lightweight PUF key generator is very hard to achieve without optimizing the error correction coding/decoding overhead regardless of a hardware or software implementation approach. The MRR method we present provides a new approach to substantially minimize the error correction overhead.
G. Limitations and Future Work 1) Generalizability: In our experimental study, we have evaluated our MRR approach using SRAM PUFs. Although we have discussed the generalizability to other silicon based PUF types in Section VI-D where the expected bit error rate increases outside of the reference operating conditions, the MRR approach may not provide an implementation efficiency for PUF types that do not exhibit the above behavior. We believe the investigation of MRR to all PUF types raises an interesting research question to be investigated in the future.
2) Soft-Decision Decoding: We have focused on harddecision decoding and not considered the impact of our approach on soft-decision decoding. In general, we believe the MRR approach used with a soft-decision decoding strategy can further reduce implementation overhead. Consider, for example, the two approaches: i) soft-in-soft-out [36] , [38] ; and ii) hard-in-soft-out [47] where information of bitspecific reliability is employed as helper data to point out reliable responses to improve the gain of the PUF key generator. Now, instead of enrolling the bit-specific reliability along with the response itself under a single reference operating condition, bit-specific reliability along with response itself under multiple reference operating conditions can be deployed. We can see that the MRR approach has the potential to help lower key the failure rate further and, consequently, reduce the footprint of the needed key generator implementation.
The extent to which the MRR approach can provide a benefit under soft-decision decoding should be investigated further. However, we can see that soft-in-soft-out decision decoding in [36] and decoding strategy based on hard-insoft-out proposed in [47] are found to be vulnerable to the helper data manipulation attacks proposed in [37] . Therefore, care should be taken in selecting the soft-decision decoding methods for evaluation.
3) A Tight Bound for Key Failure Rate With MRR: In our current work, we limit our evaluation of P fail given in (5) to employing mi n{P 2 j }, j ∈ {1, ..., J } to demonstrate the MRR's efficacy in a very conservative setting. Tight bounds on evaluating P fail that considers the complexity of correlations between the reference responses leaves for very interesting future work. 
VII. CONCLUSION
We developed the MRR approach to significantly reduce the overhead of RFE and FE implementations and proposed MR 3 FE and MR 2 FE for lightweight mutual authentication and key generation. We validated our approach using a class of ultra low power MCUs employed by a CRFID transponder (WISP5.1LGR) as an exemplary resource constrained IoT device. Our extensive experimental results and analysis that included SRAM PUF data from 23 ultra lower power MCUs demonstrate that, regardless of response enrollment approaches, (R)FE with MRR will always greatly outperform the conventional (R)FE with a single reference response. Enrolling more reference responses under fine-grained operating conditions can further reduce a token's overhead, specifically, in MR 3 FE case, because its overhead is independent of the number of enrolled MRR. The proposed MRR is not only applicable to the studied SRAM PUF but also to other silicon PUF types. Dedicated and specific implementation optimization, e.g, C code optimizations, can be exploited to further decrease the absolute overhead we have reported in the paper.
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